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“It cannot be helped, it is as it should be, that the law is behind the times.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Changes in the health care industry and increasing costs of health care create 
incentives for hospitals to consider hospital mergers.  From 1981 to 1991, as many as 
195 hospitals underwent mergers.2  The next decade demonstrated a drastic upsurge 
of hospital mergers, from 18 in 1993 to 735 in 1995.3  This rise in mergers may stem 
from economic reasons, but also may be attributable to the federal government’s 
difficulties in enjoining such mergers under the antitrust laws.  This article will 
demonstrate that Cleveland Clinic Health System’s (CCHS) recent mergers and 
acquisitions have increased market concentration, giving CCHS undue market 
control, and triggering serious antitrust concerns justifying further investigation by 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).   
A network of not-for-profit hospitals, CCHS provides acute-care health care 
services to Northeast Ohio.  CCHS claims that its mergers and hospital combinations 
create a service for the people of Northeast Ohio with which no other health system 
in the area can compete.4  CCHS consists of Euclid Hospital, Fairview Hospital, 
Hillcrest Hospital, Huron Hospital, Lakewood Hospital, Lutheran Hospital, 
Marymount Hospital, South Pointe Hospital, Cleveland Clinic Children’s Hospital 
Rehabilitation, and The Cleveland Clinic.5  Also affiliated with CCHS are Ashtabula 
County Medical Center and Grace Hospital.6  These hospital affiliates take part in 
numerous programs provided by CCHS, but have not yet been legally merged into 
CCHS.7  
This article analyzes the implications of the Clayton Antitrust Act8 (Clayton Act) 
and the Sherman Antitrust Act9 (Sherman Act) as they pertain to the CCHS.  Part 
One provides background analysis of these two statutes, and the application of those 
statutes to mergers in the health care industry.  Part Two discusses the elements 
needed to prove the government’s prima facie case.  This consists of a discussion of 
a relevant market, which includes the product and geographic markets.  This section 
also contains a description and analysis of market concentration, measured by the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).  Part Three provides further background 
                                                                
1Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, speech at Harvard Law School Association of New York, 
New York City, February 15, 1913.  Speeches by Oliver Wendell Holmes 101 (1934). 
2Donna A. Alexander, UPMC Mergers Under Antitrust Law:  An Analysis of the 
Application of the Federal Antitrust Laws to Non-Profit Hospital Mergers, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 





7Alexander, supra note 2, at 77. 
8Clayton Act §§ 1-14, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-25 (2002). 
9Sherman Act §§ 1-7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2002). 
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information on the CCHS hospital affiliates, and discusses CCHS’ recent acquisition 
activities.  Part Four analyzes whether these recent activities amount to a violation of 
antitrust laws, warranting further investigation by the FTC.  This section also 
provides a description and analysis of two possible defenses that CCHS may raise.   
II.  OVERVIEW OF THE RELEVANT ANTITRUST LAWS 
 Antitrust laws, in general, help to maintain a competitive market, and in 
turn protect the consumer from unwarranted price increases.10  The Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) are the federal agencies 
charged with enforcing the Clayton Act11 and the Sherman Act.12  These two statutes 
preserve competition and protect consumers from unfair price increases.13  Similarly, 
the antitrust laws afford protection to existing competitors as well as potential 
competitors attempting to enter the market.14   
                                                                
10Alexander, supra note 2, at 79. 
11Clayton Act §§ 1-14, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-25 (2001).  Section 18 of the Clayton Act states in 
relevant part:  “No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall 
acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no 
person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or 
any part of the assets of another person engaged also in commerce or in any activity affecting 
commerce, where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any 
section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen 
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.  No person shall acquire, directly or indirectly, 
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no person subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets 
of one or more persons engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in 
any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the 
effect of such acquisition, of such stocks or assets, or of the use of such stock by the voting or 
granting of proxies or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to 
create a monopoly.” Id.   
12Sherman Act §§ 1-7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7.  The Sherman Act states in relevant part: “Every 
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. 
Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby 
declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be 
punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, 
$350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the 
discretion of the court… 
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire 
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction 
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other 
person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, 
in the discretion of the court.”  Id.  
13Kenneth E. Yeadon, Allowing Large Hospitals to Merge:  United States v. Long Island 
Jewish Medical Center, 3 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 79, 79-80 (1999). 
14First Delaware Valley Citizens Television, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 925, 930 
(E.D. Pa. 1975).   
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A.  The Sherman Act 
In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Act, the first federal antitrust statute 
enacted in the United States.15  Its purpose is to prevent competitors from creating 
monopolies through mergers, thus driving up prices.16  The framers of the Sherman 
Act did not intend to restrain competent business decisions of any given company or 
individual, absent the intent to monopolize.17  The Sherman Act allows for a great 
deal of freedom to contract or otherwise, absent the intent to monopolize, but 
collaborative action through combinations and mergers raises a different problem.  
The Act prohibits such action when it tends to lessen or destroy competition in any 
given market, to which the consumer has sought protection.18  This gives companies 
the ability to exercise business judgment without being concerned about potential 
violations of the antitrust laws.  As long as these decisions are not for the purpose of 
monopolizing then the company in question is exempt from prosecution under the 
Sherman Act.19  In 1890, Congress intended to use the Commerce Clause of the 
United States Constitution to its full potential to have it reach the substantive 
prohibitions of the Sherman Act, thus creating a competitive business market under 
the fullest use of Congressional power permitted by the Constitution to regulate 
interstate and foreign commerce.20   
The Sherman Act embraces a distinct economic theory, i.e., that uninhibited 
competition better regulates prices and production than even the most enlightened 
merger.21  Nevertheless, the Sherman Act does not apply to monopolies in and of 
themselves.22  The Sherman Act’s purpose is to restrict and restrain activities and 
combinations that inhibit or affect interstate commerce.23  
                                                                
15Alexander, supra note 2, at 79. 
16Id. 
17Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass’n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925). 
“[T]rade associations or combinations of persons or corporations which openly and 
fairly gather and disseminate information as to the cost of their product, … the actual 
price which the product has brought in past transactions, stocks of merchandise on 
hand, approximate cost of transportation from the principal point of shipment to the 
points of consumption, as did these defendants, and who, as they did, meet and discuss 
such information and statistics without however reaching or attempting to reach any 
agreement or any concerted action with respect to prices or production or restraining 
competition, do not thereby engage in unlawful restraint of commerce.”  Id. at 586. 
18Id. at 578. 
19See Id. 
20Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 487 F.2d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 1973) (citing U.S. v. South-
Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 558-59; 88 L. Ed. 1440, 64 S. Ct. 1162 (1944)). 
21United States v. Nat’l Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y.1945). 
22Bigelow v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., 167 F. 721 (6th Cir. 1909).   
23Id. 
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The Sherman Act will not be used to prevent normal growth of any particular 
business; the size of a company itself is not a violation of the Act.24  As long as a 
company gains expanse through lawful means, and violates no other law to 
perpetuate company growth, the company will not trigger the Sherman Act.25  The 
Act however does not necessarily look to the form or the means of the merger, but 
looks at the intended results to be achieved by such merger.26  It is irrelevant whether 
the means used to achieve the illegal end are themselves legal or illegal.27  If the 
company’s means perpetuate a conspiracy to eliminate competition, then such 
activity is within the scope of what the Act prohibits.28   
Sherman Act decisions are highly fact specific.29  Courts closely analyze the facts 
of each case because the Sherman Act does not provide any definitions for its 
terms.30  Despite the absence of these definitions, congressional intent analysis 
indicates that the terms “contract,” “combination,” or “conspiracy in restraint of 
trade or commerce,” may be interpreted and given the same meaning attributed to 
these words through common law.31  In applying this rule to potential antitrust cases, 
district courts and circuit courts often hold that each case arising under the Act must 
be resolved based on the facts presented in the record of each case.32  Therefore, each 
new case that arises must be factually distinguished from any prior case being 
examined as precedent.33  Consequently, cases arising under the Sherman Act will be 
relatively difficult to prove, as precedent will be limited.  With each case primarily 
fact driven, it will be difficult, although not impossible, to locate cases on point.   
Although the Sherman Act seeks to protect a competitive market, its role is not a 
cure-all for all wrongs committed in the marketplace.34  A literal approach to section 
one of the Sherman Act would prohibit every contact, combination, or conspiracy 
that restrained trade.35  If courts used this standard, section one would prohibit nearly 
                                                                
24United States v. N.Y. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626, 642 (E.D. Ill. 1946) 
(citations omitted).   
25Id.  
26First Delaware Valley Citizens Television, Inc. v. CBS, Inc. and WHP, Inc., 398 F. 




29United States v. Parker-Rust-Proof Co., 61 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. Mich. 1945). 
30Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass’n, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).  See also Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. 
United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933), overruled on other grounds by Copperweld Corp. v. 
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); Sugar Institute, Inc., v. U.S., 297 U.S. 553 
(1936).   
31Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
32Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass’n, 268 U.S. at 579.   
33Id.   
34Sitkin Smelting & Refining Co. v. FMC Corp., 575 F.2d 440, 448 (3rd Cir. 1978). 
35Id. at 446 (citing Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 US 1, 5 (1958)). 
142 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 17:137 
every contract or combination concerning trade, because in some sense every 
agreement or merger concerning trade will in some way restrain trade.36  Therefore, 
courts interpret this section of the Sherman Act to prohibit only those contracts or 
combinations that unreasonably restrain competition.37    
1.  Discussion of the Rule of Reason 
The United States Supreme Court held in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 
Inc.,38 that the most widely used standard in the application of the Sherman Act is the 
rule of reason.39  Under the requirements of the rule of reason the finder of fact must 
consider all of the circumstances surrounding an activity to determine whether such 
activity should be prohibited as an unreasonable restraint on trade.40  Certain 
situations that arise however, will be considered violative of the Sherman Act absent 
any contemplation of the situation’s reasonableness.41  Using the rule of reason in 
every case would be time consuming and expensive, thus expenses have been saved 
and time spent on litigation reduced by the recognition of per se rules.42   
Before 1975, courts generally held that members of the medical profession and 
other “learned professions” were exempt from antitrust laws.43  The exemption 
stemmed from the Supreme Court view that involvement in “learned professions” 
was not interstate in nature, and therefore did not fall within the scope of the 
Sherman Act.44  The Supreme Court restricted this exemption in the case of 
American Medical Association v. United States.45  In that case, the Court considered 
whether the medical profession participated in “trade” or “commerce” within the 
scope of the Sherman Act.46  But, the Court refused to answer the question, stating 
“the calling or occupation of the individual physicians charged as defendants is 
immaterial if the purpose and effect of their conspiracy was . . . obstruction and 
restraint of the business of Group Health.”47  The court will no longer concentrate on 
the status of the person participating in the prohibited conduct, but will focus instead 
on the status of the target of such restraint. By recognizing this shift in focus, the 
Court established the possibility that federal antitrust laws could apply to the learned 
                                                                
36Id.   
37Id.   
38Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
39Id.  
40Id. 
41Id.   
42Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982).   
43MATTHEW BENDER, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 70.01 (2d ed. 2001).    
44Id.   
45Id.   
46American Medical Association v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 528 (1943).   
47Id. 
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professions.48  It was not until the 1975 landmark case Goldfarb v. Virginia State 
Bar49 that the Court eliminated the “learned professions” exemption to antitrust 
laws.50  Today, it is well understood that the activities of “learned professions” 
represent an important part of interstate commerce, and that anticompetitive 
activities by these professionals may constitute unreasonable restraint on 
commerce.51   
2.  Application of the Per Se Rule 
The Sherman Act’s per se rule applies to many industries.  This design creates a 
rebuttable presumption that the health care industry will also be within the scope of 
the Sherman Act.  In the past, the Supreme Court demonstrated some reluctance in 
applying the per se rule to activities in the health care industry.  The Court though 
has also made it clear that this industry is not exempt from the application of this 
rule.52  In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Co.,53 the Supreme Court applied the 
per se rule, disallowing price-fixing by physicians, stating “[i]n unequivocal terms…, 
‘[whatever] may be its peculiar problems and characteristics, the Sherman Act, so far 
as price-fixing agreements are concerned, establishes one uniform rule applicable to 
all industries alike.’”54  Before the case reached the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals refused to apply the per se rule reasoning that the health care 
market was far removed from the competitive model.55  Lower federal courts remain 
reluctant to apply the per se rule to the health care industry.56   
B.  The Clayton Act 
Due to the rigid and narrow interpretation of the Sherman Act by the Supreme 
Court that made it difficult for the government to prove an antitrust violation, 
Congress passed the Clayton Act in 1914.57  Following its passage, Congress made 
numerous amendments to the Clayton Act, the most drastic being the revision of 
                                                                
48BENDER, supra note 43. 
49421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
50Id. 
51Id. at 788. 
52Id.   
53457 U.S. 332 at 349 (citations omitted).   
54Id.  
55Id. at 349-350.   
56See generally Medical Arts Pharmacy, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 518 F. 
Supp. 1100, 1107 (D. Conn. 1981), aff’d, 675 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1982); Oksanen v. Page 
Memorial Hosp., 945 F.2d 696, 708 (4th Cir. 1991); Kiepfer v. Beller, 944 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 
1991); U.S. v. Alston, 974 F.2d 1206, 1214 (9th Cir. 1992); Betkerur v. Aultman Hosp. Ass’n, 
78 F.3d 1079, 1093 (6th Cir. 1996); Retina Associates, P.A. v. Southern Baptist Hosp., 105 
F.3d 1376, 1381-82, reh’g denied, 113 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 1997); Pontius v. Children’s 
Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 1352, 1369 (W.D. Pa. 1982). 
57Alexander, supra note 2, at 79.  
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December 29, 1950, which reworded the first five paragraphs of the original Clayton 
Act.58  Congress made subsequent amendments in 1980, 1984, 1995, and 1996, but 
none of these amendments were as extensive as the changes made in 1950.59   
                                                                
5815 U.S.C. § 18 (2001).  The 1950 amendments of December 29, 1950, substituted the 
first five paragraphs for ones that read:  
“That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the 
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of another corporation engaged 
also in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen 
competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the corporation 
making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any section or community, or 
tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce.”  
 
“No corporation shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock 
or other share capital of two or more corporations engaged in commerce where the 
effect of such acquisition, or the use of such stock by the voting or granting of proxies 
or otherwise, may be to substantially lessen competition between such corporations, or 
any of them, whose stock or other share capital is so acquired, or to restrain such 
commerce in any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly of any line of 
commerce.”  
 
“This section shall not apply to corporations purchasing such stock solely for 
investment and not using the same by voting or otherwise to bring about, or in 
attempting to bring about, the substantial lessening of competition.  Nor shall anything 
contained in this section prevent a corporation engaged in commerce from causing the 
formation of subsidiary corporations for the actual carrying on of their immediate 
lawful business, or the natural and legitimate branches or extensions thereof, or from 
owning and holding all or a part of the stock of such subsidiary corporations, when the 
effect of such formation is not to substantially lessen competition.”  
 
“Nor shall anything herein contained be construed to prohibit any common carrier 
subject to the laws to regulate commerce from aiding in the construction of branches 
or short lines so located as to become feeders to the main line of the company so 
aiding in such construction or from acquiring or owning all or any part of the stock of 
such branch lines, nor to prevent any such common carrier from acquiring and owning 
all or any part of the stock of a branch or short line constructed by an independent 
company where there is no substantial competition between the company owning the 
branch line so constructed and the company owning the main line acquiring the 
property or an interest therein, nor to prevent such common carrier from extending any 
of its lines through the medium of the acquisition of stock or otherwise of any other 
such common carrier where there is no substantial competition between the company 
extending its lines and the company whose stock, property, or an interest therein is so 
acquired.”  
 
“Nothing contained in this section shall be held to affect or impair any right heretofore 
legally acquired: provided, that nothing in this section shall be held or construed to 
authorize or make lawful anything heretofore prohibited or made illegal by the 
antitrust laws, nor to exempt any person from the penal provisions thereof or the civil 
remedies therein provided.”  Id. 
59Id.  See infra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.   
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1.  Discussion of Seminal Antitrust Case:  Brown Shoe Co. v. United States 
The seminal Brown Shoe Co. v. United States60 decision interprets the 1950 
changes to the Clayton Act.  The original 1914 text of the Clayton Act disallowed 
the acquisition of stock of one corporation by another corporation, when the 
acquisition would create a substantial lessening of competition between the two 
companies or would tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.61  The 
original text of the Clayton Act did not prohibit the acquisition of the assets of one 
corporation by another corporation.62  Similarly, the original Clayton Act did not 
prohibit the acquisition of stock in one company by any other company other than a 
direct competitor.63   
Early interpreters of the Clayton Act believed that the drafters of the original text 
of the Act overlooked the fact that an asset acquisition may result in just as 
substantial a lessening of competition as a stock acquisition.  A close inspection of 
the legislative history establishes that this belief lacks merit.64  On the contrary, 
during the debates over the Clayton Act, legislators discussed asset acquisitions, but 
deemed them unimportant, as the purpose was to prevent the development of holding 
companies and acquisitions of competitors through the purchases of their stock.65   
After the Clayton Act passage in 1914, it was not long before the FTC found 
problems with the language and limits of the Act, most specifically in section 
seven.66  Initially the FTC wanted to address two issues:  first, plugging the loophole 
that allowed for an exemption of asset acquisitions under the Act; second, requiring 
companies to give notification of proposed mergers to the FTC before 
consummation.67  Congress held numerous hearings on both of these proposals.  
Neither proposal ever reached the floor of Congress however, until the adoption of 
the amendments in 1950.68  The legislative history indicates that the original scope of 
the proposed amendment of 1950 to section seven was only to reach asset and stock 
acquisitions and their potential threat to competition, but once the proposal reached 
the floor of Congress, a number of hearings conducted by both the Eightieth and 
Eighty-first Congresses provided a broader scope for the soon-to-be amended section 
seven.69  
Prior to the 1950 amendments of the Clayton Act, the FTC and Congress had 
great difficulty interpreting the language of section seven of the Act.  Between the 
                                                                
60370 U.S. 294 (1962). 




65Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 313-14. 
66Id. at 314; see also 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2001).   
67Id. 
68Id. 
69Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 314-15. 
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years of 1943 and 1949, legislators introduced as many as sixteen bills to amend 
section seven of the Clayton Act to Congress for their consideration.  In three 
separate sessions, and in full public hearings, Congress discussed issues regarding 
these proposed amendments.70  Even with a close inspection of the legislative history 
concerning the 1950 amendments, the congressional standards intended for the FTC 
and the courts to use to determine whether a proposed merger was legal remain 
elusive.71  Although section seven of the Clayton Act, as amended in 1950, does not 
explicitly state the standards needed for a proper and fair adjudication of the legality 
of a proposed merger, the House and Senate reports provided sufficient information. 
The transcripts from the floor debates further provided proper guidance for the FTC, 
as well as for the courts when reviewing proposed mergers and acquisitions.72  The 
1950 amendments, combined with the interpretation of the House and Senate 
Reports, substantially alleviated the problems from the original 1914 Clayton Act 
and the difficulty with enforcing the Sherman Act.   
In Brown Shoe Co., one of the first United States Supreme Court cases 
subsequent to the 1950 amendments, the government based its complaint on 
accusations that the defendant had been in violation of section seven of the Clayton 
Act.73  Initially, the FTC filed a claim asserting that the possible merger between the 
defendant shoe companies, by way of a stock exchange, violated section seven of the 
Clayton Act.74  The complaint requested injunctive relief to prevent achievement of 
the merger.75  At trial, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Missouri held that the proposed merger of the two companies violated section seven 
of the Clayton Act as amended in 1950, and granted the FTC’s injunction denying 
the merger.76  The United States Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s 
decision, holding that the merger would be likely to considerably reduce competition 
in the retail sale of men's, women's, and children's shoes, specifically in a large 
majority of cities and their surrounding areas where both defendants did business.77  
The defendant’s failure to prove that the company proposed the merger to prevent 
the loss of resources due to a failing firm, or that the proposed merger would make it 
possible for smaller competitors to enter the market, triggered the court’s decision.78 
                                                                
70Id. 
71Id. at 315.   
72Id. 
73See Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 311-12 
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2.  Eight Factors Established by Brown Shoe Co. v. United States 
The purpose of the 1950 amendments was to make all types of mergers (vertical 
and horizontal), acquisitions, and conglomerations subject to the Clayton Act.79  In 
Brown Shoe, the Court established an eight-factor test for determining the validity of 
a proposed merger under the Clayton Act.80  First, Congress made both asset sales 
and stock acquisitions subject to the Act.81  Second, Congress deleted the language 
“acquiring-acquired,” with the purpose of making it easier to have section seven 
apply not only to horizontal mergers but also to vertical and conglomerate mergers.  
If not prohibited, these mergers could result in the lessening of competition in a line 
of commerce in a section of the country.82  Third, Congress sought to afford power to 
the FTC and courts to prevent such mergers and acquisitions resulting in undue 
concentration from occurring before potential harm could reach the consumer.83   
Fourth, Congress intended to apply the Sherman Act standards to section seven 
of the Clayton Act as well.84  This move helped to establish the understanding that 
the Clayton Act and the Sherman Act compliment each other and should be read 
together.  Although the standards used to prove a case are now the same, it will be 
easier for the government to make a case under the Clayton Act, as the language of 
the statute can be and has been interpreted more broadly.   
Fifth, Congress was concerned with competition, not competitors, therefore it 
was not Congress’ intent to prevent mergers of two small competitors or a viable 
company merging with a failing company, so that those competitors may still 
compete in the market. Congress instead intended to prevent the type of 
combinations that would substantially lesson competition in a section of the 
country.85  A blanket look at the legislative history illustrates that the concern 
Congress has lies with the protection of competition, not the individual competitors, 
and it shows that Congress has the aspirations to only restrain mergers and 
acquisitions to the extent that these activities will result in the tendency to lessen 
competition in any given market.86   
Sixth, Congress did not adopt or reject any test for the measurement of either of 
the relevant markets (product or geographic).87  Congress also did not define the 
word “substantially” in any way, which would have given the courts a means of 
                                                                
79United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours and Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).  See also 
Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 294. 
80Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 316.   
81Id.   
82Id. at 317.   
83Id. 317-18.   
84Id. at 318.   
85Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 319-20.   
86Id. at 320 (emphasis original).    
87Id.   
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measuring the competitive or anticompetitive effects of a proposed merger.88  It 
appears that this was to be left up to the interpretation of the court.    
Seventh, although neither the FTC nor the DOJ have established any tests, 
quantitative, qualitative, or otherwise, to define whether any activity “substantially” 
lessens competition or tends toward a monopoly, Congress has indicated that a 
merger or acquisition has to be functionally viewed in the framework of its market.89  
This means that the proposed merger or acquisition will be viewed in light of 
whether it will take place in a concentrated market, where it had recent activity by a 
few controlling companies attempting to dominate the market, or, where there is easy 
accessibility to the market by other competitors and suppliers, or finally, where the 
company created barriers to prevent the entrance of other competitors.90  All of these 
factors will be taken into account when determining whether a merger or acquisition 
results in “substantially” lessening competition in an industry.91   
Eighth and finally, Congress couched section seven’s words “may be 
substantially to lesson competition” in terms of probabilities, not certainties.92  
Although Congress did not provide an explicit definition of the term “substantially,” 
it did provide direction for the FTC and the courts in gauging the anticompetitive 
possibilities of a potential merger.  Thus, one purpose of the Clayton Act was to 
address potential harm to competition in the market.93   
1980 brought an additional and important amendment to the text of the Clayton 
Act.94  In the original 1914 version of the Clayton Act, Congress used the word 
“corporation” throughout the Act when describing the potential antitrust defendant.95  
The use of this word continued though the 1950 amendments of the Act.96  In 1980, 
Congress changed the word “corporation(s)” to “person(s),” wherever it appeared in 
the Clayton Act, prohibiting anticompetitive acquisitions by a larger group of 
entities, because the word “person(s)” may be more broadly defined than the word 
“corporation(s).”97  With the 1980 amendment, Congress meant to eliminate the 
loophole in section seven of the Clayton Act.98  
                                                                
88Id. at 321.   
89Id. at 321-22. 
90Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 321-22. 
91Id. 
92Id. at 323 (emphasis original). 
93Id. 
9415 U.S.C. § 18 Ann. 
95See 15 U.S.C. § 18 Ann.  
96Id. 
97In re Adventist Health Sys., No. 9234, 1991 F.T.C. LEXIS 354, at *38 (F.T.C. Aug. 2, 
1991) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 18). 
98Id. at *39 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 18a) (citations omitted). 
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Two particular features make the 1980 amendment significant.99  First, as with 
the amendments of 1950, this amendment expanded the reach of section seven, and it 
demonstrates that Congress intends to eventually be able to reach all possible activity 
that may have an anticompetitive result.  Thus, Congress is allowing only “pure” 
asset acquisitions in a select few controlled industries.100  Section eleven of the 
Clayton Act, therefore, which discusses jurisdictional issues, should not be 
interpreted narrowly in order to exclude certain entities from the jurisdictional reach 
of the prosecuting bodies.101  Also, with the insertion of the word “person(s)” instead 
of “corporation(s)” in section seven and section eleven of the Clayton Act, courts 
may use section eleven of the Clayton Act, as opposed to the FTC Act, to determine 
whether the FTC has jurisdiction over a particular issue.102  The FTC benefits from 
this change, as section eleven may be, and has been interpreted more broadly than 
the FTC Act.103   
Second, by changing the language of the statute to read “person” instead of 
“corporation,” the amendment made section seven of the Clayton Act more 
inclusive.  It is now possible for section seven of the act to reach all entities defined 
in section one of the Act.104  This amendment also eliminates any prior confusion 
between terms in this Act with the terms used in the FTC Act.105 
The legislative history of the Clayton Act establishes that the tests for 
determining the legality of a merger or acquisition are less stringent than those used 
                                                                
99Adventist Health Sys., No. 9234, 1991 F.T.C. LEXIS 354, at *39. 




104Adventist Health Sys., No. 9234, at *39.  See also 15 U.S.C. § 21 Ann.  
(a) Commission, Board, or Secretary authorized to enforce compliance. Authority to 
enforce compliance with sections 2, 3, 7, and 8 of this Act [15 USCS §§ 13, 14, 18, 
19] by the persons respectively subject thereto is hereby vested in the Surface 
Transportation Board where applicable to common carriers subject to jurisdiction 
under subtitle IV of title 49, United States Code [49 USCS §§ 10101 et seq.]; in the 
Federal Communications Commission where applicable to common carriers engaged 
in wire or radio communication or radio transmission of energy; in the Secretary of 
Transportation where applicable to air carriers and foreign air carriers subject to the 
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 [49 USCS Appx §§ 1301 et seq.]; in the Federal Reserve 
Board [Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System] where applicable to banks, 
banking associations, and trust companies; and in the Federal Trade Commission 
where applicable to all other character of commerce to be exercised as follows:  
 
(b) Issuance of complaints for violations; hearing; intervention; filing of testimony; 
report; cease and desist orders; reopening and alteration of reports or orders. 
Whenever the Commission, Board, or Secretary vested with jurisdiction thereof shall 
have reason to believe that any person is violating or has violated any of the provisions 
of sections 2, 3, 7, and 8 of this Act [15 USCS §§ 13, 14, 18, 19]… Id.  
105Id. 
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under the Sherman Act.106  Similarly, the Clayton Act only requires a showing of a 
potential anticompetitive effect while the Sherman Act requires a showing of actual 
restraint.107  Because the test used to decide a case under the Clayton Act differs 
slightly from that used for a claim arising under the Sherman Act, court decisions 
under the Sherman Act are not binding precedent under the Clayton Act, and vice 
versa.108   
3.  Application of Section 7 of the Clayton Act to Not-For-Profit Hospitals 
Some scholars argue that section seven of the Clayton Act does not apply to not-
for-profit hospitals, because under section eleven of the Clayton Act, the FTC lacks 
jurisdiction to hear such cases.109  Conversely, courts determined that section seven 
of the Clayton Act does apply to not-for-profit hospitals.  Courts have held that 
section eleven of the Clayton Act110 gives jurisdiction to the FTC to enforce the 
provisions set forth in section seven of the Clayton Act over mergers and 
acquisitions by nonprofit entities.111  Three other decisions rendered by federal courts 
and decided after Philadelphia National Bank, scrutinize the issue of whether asset 
acquisitions made by not-for-profit hospitals will “be subjected to a government 
antitrust prosecution under the Clayton Act.”112  
                                                                
106Treadway Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 389 F. Supp. 996 (D.N.J. 1974). 
107Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311 
(1965). 
108United States v. Smith Pie Co., 440 F.Supp. 220 (E.D. Pa. 1976).   
109See Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. at 321; Adventist Health Sys. No. 9234, 1991 
F.T.C. LEXIS 354, *1. 
11015 U.S.C. § 21 (2001).  Section 11 of the Clayton Act states in relevant part; 
“(a) Commission, Board, or Secretary authorized to enforce compliance. Authority to 
enforce compliance with sections 2, 3, 7, and 8 of this Act [15 U.S.C.S. § 13, 14, 18, 
19] by the persons respectively subject thereto is hereby vested in the Surface 
Transportation Board where applicable to common carriers subject to jurisdiction 
under subtitle IV of title 49, United States Code [49 U.S.C.S. § 10101 et seq.]; in the 
Federal Communications Commission where applicable to common carriers engaged 
in wire or radio communication or radio transmission of energy; in the Secretary of 
Transportation where applicable to air carriers and foreign air carriers subject to the 
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 [49 U.S.C.S. Appx § 1301 et seq.]; in the Federal 
Reserve Board [Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System] where applicable 
to banks, banking associations, and trust companies; and in the Federal Trade 
Commission where applicable to all other character of commerce to be exercised as 
follows:” Id. 
111Adventist Health Sys., No. 9234, 1991 F.T.C. LEXIS 354, at *3. 
112Id. at *49 (discussing, F.T.C. v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991); 
United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. 
Ct. 295 (1990); United States v. Carilion Health Sys., No. 89-2625, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 
2657). 
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In the first of the three cases, FTC v. University Health, Inc.,113 the plaintiff, 
FTC, sought a preliminary injunction from the court to prevent University Health, 
Inc., a nonprofit corporation owning other nonprofit hospitals in the Augusta Georgia 
area, from acquiring St. Joseph Hospital, also a nonprofit hospital.114  Even though 
the court denied FTC’s request for a preliminary injunction, the court also denied a 
motion to dismiss by the defendants, based on the nonprofit status of the hospitals.115  
The FTC appealed the district court’s decision.  Although there was no discussion of 
the FTC’s jurisdiction over this matter, it would have been impossible for the court 
to make a decision on the merits of such a case without first determining that the 
FTC had jurisdiction under section seven of the Clayton Act, concerning the asset 
acquisitions by nonprofit hospitals.116   
In the second case, United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp.,117 the DOJ 
attempted to prevent the merger of two nonprofit hospitals.118  The court held that the 
merger was in violation of section seven of the Clayton Act, and the defendants 
appealed, claiming that a merger of two nonprofit hospitals was outside the scope of 
section seven of the Clayton Act.119  The court disagreed because Illinois law forbade 
nonprofit corporations from having stock. The court refused to expand the broad 
interpretation of this clause as it was used in the Philadelphia National Bank case.120   
Judge Posner wrote for the court in Rockford Memorial Corp., in which he 
provides a complete analysis of the application of section seven, generally to 
nonprofit companies, but specifically to nonprofit hospitals.121  Posner suggests that 
assuming that the language in section seven of the Clayton Act, which states, 
“person[s] subject to the jurisdiction of the FTC,” refers to the FTC Act, disregards 
the plausibility that the language in section seven may be referring to the language in 
section eleven of the Clayton Act.122  Section eleven grants jurisdiction to five 
agencies over specified violations of the enumerated section; in this list the FTC’s 
jurisdiction appears to be a catchall for the items not listed.123   
                                                                
113F.T.C. v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991). 
114Adventist Health Sys., No. 9234, 1991 F.T.C. LEXIS 354, at *49 (discussing University 
Health, Inc., 938 F.2d at 1206). 
115Id. 
116Id. at *49-50. 
117United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 
S. Ct. 295 (1990). 
118Adventist Health Sys., No. 9234, 1991 F.T.C. LEXIS 354, at *50. 
119Id. 
120Id. at *50-51.  See generally Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. at 321. 
121In re Adventist Health Sys., 114 F.T.C. at 481. 
122Id. (quoting Rockford Mem’l Corp., 898 F.2d at 1280-81).  See also 15 U.S.C. § 21 
(2001). 
123In re Adventist Health Sys., 114 F.T.C. at 481 (quoting Rockford Mem’l Corp., 898 F.2d 
at 1280-81). 
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This section of the Clayton Act also describes the procedures these enforcing 
bodies must follow.124  These procedures apply to the Clayton Act, absent any other 
procedural Acts with regards to these agencies.125  Thus, when Congress, in 1950, 
expanded section seven, it did the same with section eleven.126  Therefore, the asset 
acquisitions that will be exempt from the jurisdiction of these agencies are those set 
forth in section eleven, and not those exempted by any other procedural act 
applicable to these agencies outside the Clayton Act.127  Applying this rationale, 
hospital mergers are not exempt, because section eleven of the Clayton Act does not 
state an exemption from the FTC’s jurisdiction for such mergers and acquisitions.128  
Section eleven put limitations on the FTC’s jurisdictional reach, by stating that 
jurisdiction lies with other agencies in regards to industries which these agencies 
regulate.  The statute makes no mention of nonprofit companies.  Thus, the catchall 
language of section eleven vests jurisdiction over these matters in the FTC.129 
Although the court’s analysis of the application of section seven and eleven of 
the Clayton Act in this case constitutes dicta, the analysis must still be given due 
consideration by the FTC.130  The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
injunction. The court based its decision on an analysis under section one of the 
Sherman Act.131    
The third case discussing asset acquisition with not-for-profit hospitals is United 
States v. Carilion Health System.132  In this case the DOJ brought an antitrust claim 
under section one of the Sherman Act and under section seven of the Clayton Act, to 
enjoin the consolidation of two nonprofit hospitals in Roanoke, Virginia.133  The 
district court granted dismissal for the defendant, because it found that in an 
acquisition of a nonprofit hospital there is no stock involved, and thus section seven 
of the Clayton Act did not apply.134  The district court further held that the 
acquisition clause of section seven did not apply, because the FTC did not have 
jurisdiction over nonprofit entities.135  The district court did not state, in determining 
the jurisdictional issue, why it used the FTC Act as opposed to section eleven of the 




127Id.  See also AREEDA & TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW at 109 n.2 (1989 Supp.). 
128In re Adventist Health Sys., 114 F.T.C. at 481-82. 
129Id.   
130Id. at 482  (discussing Rockford Mem’l Corp., 898 F.2d at 1280-81). 
131Id. at *55-56 (discussing Rockford Mem’l Corp., 898 F.2d at 1278). 
132United States v. Carilion Health Sys., 707 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Va. 1989), aff'd mem., 
892 F.2d 1042 (4th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). 
133Adventist Health Sys., No. 9234, 1991 F.T.C. LEXIS 354, at *55-56, (discussing 
Carilion Health Sys., 707 F. Supp. at 840). 
134Id. at *56 (discussing Carilion Health Sys., 707 F. Supp. at 840). 
135Id.  See generally Carilion Health Sys., 707 F. Supp. at 840. 
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Clayton Act.136  After the district court’s decision, the government appealed to the 
Fourth Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s decision, and failed to address the 
issue regarding section seven of the Clayton Act.137   
III.  THE GOVERNMENT’S PRIMA FACIE CASE 
In a federal claim, the FTC typically seeks injunctive relief.  This section 
discusses the elements the government must prove to prevail on the merits of a 
section seven claim.  First, the FTC may establish its prima facie case by 
demonstrating through statistical analysis, that the entity created through the 
proposed merger would control an undue percentage of the relevant market, thus 
causing an increase in that entity’s concentration of power over a particular product 
and geographical market.138  In order for the FTC to be successful on a claim under 
section seven of the Clayton Act, it must also illustrate that the proposed merger or 
acquisition will realistically result in the significant lessening of competition in the 
relevant market in the future.139   
A.  Definition of the Relevant Market 
The described analysis determines whether an entity is attempting to monopolize 
or impair competition, resulting in the control of an excessive proportion of the 
relevant market.140  Determining exactly what constitutes the relevant market is 
extraordinarily fact specific, and thus is a factual question to be determined by a 
jury.141  The burden of proving the relevant market rests on the antitrust plaintiff, 
including the DOJ and the FTC.142  As with any determination of fact by a jury, it 
may only be overturned if that decision is found to be clearly erroneous.143  Once the 
jury has made all of its factual determinations, and neither party disputes any of 
those decisions, then the court may decide the remaining issue of the market 
definition as a matter of law.144 
                                                                
136Id. at *57. 
137Id. at *58. 
138F.T.C. v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1289 (W.D. Mich. 1996). 
139Id. (citing F.T.C. v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 267 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Federal 
Trade Comm'n v. Nat'l Tea Co., 603 F.2d 694, 698 (8th Cir. 1979))); Federal Trade Comm'n 
v. University Health Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1218 (11th Cir. 1991). 
140BENDER, supra note 48, at § 24.01(4)(a).    
141Id. 
142Id. § 24.01(4)(b).  See also E. I. Du Pont de Nemours and Co., 353 U.S. at 586; 
International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 250 (1959); Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. 
McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 455 (1993); White & White, Inc. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 
723 F.2d 495, 499-500 (6th Cir. 1983); Flegel v. Christian Hosp., Northeast-Northwest, 4 F.3d 
683, 691 (8th Cir. 1993), reh,g denied. 
143Id. 
144Id. 
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In defining the relevant market, the court seeks to identify other competitors that 
the defendant’s target consumer could turn to in the event that the merged entity tried 
to use its new market power to raise prices above competitive levels.145  Two aspects 
define the relevant market: the product market and the geographic market.146  If the 
relevant market has been properly defined it will not include potential suppliers who 
provide a product or service that varies too greatly from that of the defendant (the 
product market), or potential suppliers that are too far away from the defendant 
(geographic market).  Said supplier will also not change its practice to tender 
defendant’s customers a comparable alternative to defendant’s product or service.147 
1.  Relevant Product Market 
The first aspect of the relevant market is the relevant product market.  Because 
neither the Sherman Act nor the Clayton Act contains the necessary definition of 
either market, courts determined the definition of the relevant market.148  In the two 
vital decisions of Cellophane and Brown Shoe, the Supreme Court enunciated the 
principles that controlled the definition of the relevant product market.149  Although 
the Supreme Court determined how to define the relevant product market, that 
definition was vague.  This vague definition makes it difficult to determine the exact 
reach of the court’s definition.  Thus, there had to a means to define the outer limits 
of such market.150  Three tests were adopted to define the boundaries of the 
definition created by the Court: the “reasonable interchangeability of use,” the 
“cross-elasticity of demand” test, and the “cluster test.”151 
It is easier to understand the first two tests if discussed together.  A cursory 
glance at these two tests demonstrates their importance.  The rub of the “reasonable 
interchangeability” test is the physical characteristics and applications of the 
product.152  Also, under this test, the product market will include products or services 
that can be easily interchanged with the defendant’s product or service, taking into 
consideration price, use, and quality.153  The “cross-elasticity of demand” test does 
                                                                
145Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. at 1290 (citing United States v. Mercy Health 
Services, 902 F Supp. 968, 975 (N.D. Iowa 1995)).  
146Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, at 1290 (citing Federal Trade Comm’n v. 
Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, at 266-67 (8th Cir. 1995)).  
147Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. at 1290 (quoting United States v. Mercy Health 
Services, 902 F Supp. 968, 975-76 (N.D. Iowa 1995)). 
148BENDER, supra note 48, at § 24.02 (citations omitted).  See generally Brown Shoe Co., 
370 U.S. at 294 (stating that for the purposes of section 7 of the Clayton Act “line of 
commerce” means the relevant product market, and “section of the country” is referring to the 
geographic market). 
149Id. 
150See generally, BENDER, supra note 43, at § 24.02 (citations omitted). 
151Id. 
152BENDER, supra note 43, at § 24.02 (quoting E. I. Du Pont de Nemours and Co., 351 U.S. 
at 404). 
153Id. 
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not focus on the physical characteristics of the product, but rather focuses on the 
price of the product, and how the sales of one product will change in response to a 
variance in price of another product.154  Both tests determine what conditions will 
force the consumer to choose one product over another.155  A high cross-elasticity of 
demand shows that the products are in the same relevant product market.  A low 
cross-elasticity of demand demonstrates that the products are within different 
product markets.156   
The third and most relevant test is the “cluster test,” that presumes that a product 
market can be composed of an assemblage or “cluster” of products or services 
usually provided to the consumer as a group.157  The “cluster test” is typically used in 
defining the product market involving the mergers of commercial banks and other 
financial institutions.  Lower courts broadened the scope of this test to include the 
product market of acute-care inpatient hospital services when discussing the merger 
of two or more such hospitals.158  These lower court cases demonstrate that this test 
is best used when defining a product market that is comprised of a group of products 
or services that are related to one another (not interchangeable, but complimentary to 
one another), and where this group of products or services maintains a customer base 
distinct from that of the products or services individually.159 
2.  Relevant Geographic Market 
The other aspect of the relevant market is the geographic market.  Section seven 
of the Clayton Act prohibits any acquisition that could potentially lessen commerce 
“in any section of the country.”160  Courts interpret this phrase to refer to the 
geographic market.161  The Supreme Court defined the relevant geographic market to 
be the area in which the providers of a particular product or service compete with 
one another, and the area to which the consumers could potentially turn for an 
alternative product or service as a result of a price increase.162  A proper 
                                                                
154Id.  
155BENDER, supra note 43, at § 24.02 (citations omitted). 
156Id. at § 24.02(2)(e) (citations omitted). 
157Id. at § 24.02(3) (citing Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. at 321). 
158Id. at § 24.02(3) (citations omitted). 
159Id.  
160See generally 15 U.S.C. § 18(III)(A)(14) (2001) (citing Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at  
294). 
161Id. 
162BENDER, supra note 48, at § 24.03 (citing United States v. Connecticut Nat’l Bank, 418 
U.S. 656, 668 (1974) (relevant markets are where the merging party operates and to which the 
bulk of its customers may turn for alternative services); United States v. Phillipsburg Nat’l 
Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 363 (1970) (area of effective competition in the known line 
of commerce must be charted by careful selection of the market area in which the seller 
operates, and to which the purchaser can practicably turn for supplies); Tampa Elec. Co. v. 
Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961) (area of effective competition in the known line 
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determination of the relevant geographic market includes a necessary finding that 
such market is consistent with the “commercial realities” of the trade, and that it 
embodies an “economically significant” commerce area.163  Courts look to many 
factors in determining the relevant geographic market, including transportation costs, 
the entity’s history of entering into new areas, and where consumers might go in the 
event of a price increase by the merged entity.164  With respect to the health care 
industry, most courts define the geographic market to be the area where patients can 
turn to other health care providers for acute-care inpatient services, in the event of a 
merger or acquisition between hospitals resulting in a price increase in said care.165   
a.  Elzinga-Hogarty Two-Part Test 
In determining the relevant geographic market, most courts use the two-part 
Elzinga-Hogarty test,166 which utilizes expert testimony to determine the relevant 
geographic market in a particular case.167  The first prong of the test, as used in cases 
involving merging hospitals, requires a determination of the hospital’s “service 
area:” the places from which the hospitals draw their patients.168  In order to 
determine the service area, an expert witness examines the zip codes of discharged 
patients released from the defendant’s hospitals.169  The expert organizes those zip 
codes to create a preliminary map of the service area.170  If any other hospitals fall 
within the preliminary map, the same process will be done with those hospitals to 
create a complete service area map of all the hospitals.171 
                                                          
of commerce must be charted by careful selection of the market area in which the seller 
operates, and to which the purchaser can practicably turn for supplies); Re/Max Int’l, Inc. v. 
Realty One, Inc., 173 F.3d 995, 1016 (6th Cir. 1999) (geographic market is defined as an “area 
of effective competition … such an area is not subject to definition by metes and bounds, it is 
the locale in which consumers of a product or service can turn for alternative sources of 
supply” (citations omitted)); White & White, Inc. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 723 F.2d 
495, 501 (6th Cir. 1983) (“The central rubric in evaluating the relevant geographic market was 
stated in Tampa Electric as follows:  “[T]he area of effective competition in the known line of 
commerce must be charted by careful selection of the market area in which the seller operates, 
and to which the purchaser can practicably turn for supplies.”). 
163BENDER, supra note 43, at § 24.03(1) (citations omitted). 
164Id.  
165Alexander, supra note 2, at 88 (citing Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d at 268). 
166Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d at 264.  “A method devised by professors of economics 
Kenneth G. Elzinga and Thomas F. Hogarty to analyze patterns of consumer origin and 
destination and to identify relevant competitors of the merging entities.”  Id. 
167Alexander, supra note 2 at 88 (citing Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d at 264). 
168Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d at 264. 
169Id.  See also Alexander, supra note 2, at 88. 
170Id.  
171Id.  
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The second prong of the test requires the expert to determine where the patients 
in the service area go for health care.172  The expert under this prong of the test, as 
with the first prong, will use the zip code information of the patients to determine 
what percentage of the people in the service area, determined above, utilized hospital 
services in the established geographic area.173  In order for a relevant geographic 
market to exist, seventy-five percent of the patients in the service area must use 
hospitals within that area.174  A showing of seventy-five percent represents a weak 
market, whereas ninety percent represents a strong market.175 
3.  Market Concentration 
After defining the relevant market, the plaintiff must prove the market 
concentration of the potential merged entity.  In order for the FTC to establish its 
prima facie case, it must demonstrate that the result of a proposed merger will be “a 
significant increase in the concentration of power in the relevant markets and repose 
in the merged entity an undue share of the markets.”176  The majority of courts rely 
on the use of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to determine the market share 
controlled by any particular entity.177  To calculate the HHI for a given market, the 
percentage of the market share controlled by each competitor is squared, then the 
resulting numbers are added together.178  Under the FTC Merger Guidelines,179 an 
                                                                
172Id.  
173Alexander, supra note 2, at 88-89 (citing Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d at 265). 
174Alexander, supra note 2, at 89 (citing Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. at 1292).  
See also Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. at 1292 (“Definition of the relevant 
geographic market does not stop here however.  In addition to historical patient flow data, the 
Court must also consider evidence suggesting how consumers would respond to price 
increases by the merged entity.”) (citing Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d at 268-69; United States v. 
Mercy Health Services, 902 F. Supp. 968, 978 (N.D. Iowa 1995)). 
175Id. 
176Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. at 1294 (citing University Health, 938 F.2d at 
1218.) 
177Alexander, supra note 2, at 89.  
178Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. at 1294.  The following is an example of the 
application of the HHI.  If there where six firms in a market with the following market shares 
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§ A (1996), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) at 13, 153 and in ANTITRUST PRIMARY 
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HHI, greater than 1,800 before the proposed merger represents a highly concentrated 
market.  Likewise, the FTC views a merger that will result in an HHI increase of 100 
points or more as likely to create or augment market power or aid its exercise.180 
In Federal Trade Commission v. Butterworth Health Corporation,181 the court 
applied the HHI index and accepted the expert’s testimony that Butterworth and 
Blodgett, two hospitals proposing a merger, controlled over forty-seven to sixty-five 
percent of the relevant market, defined as “general acute-care inpatient hospital 
services in greater Kent County[Michigan].”182  The estimated HHI for this market, 
post-merger, was within the range of 2,767 to 4,521, which demonstrated a potential 
increase of between 1,064 and 1,889 points.183  The expert also determined, as to the 
“primary care inpatient hospital market,” that the proposed merged entity would 
control sixty-five to seventy percent of that market.184  If the proposed merger was 
not enjoined, the HHI for the “primary care inpatient hospital market” would 
increase to between 4,506 and 5,079, representing an increase of 1,675 to 2,001 
points.185  Based on this evidence, the expert predicted that the result of the proposed 
merger would be a highly concentrated market. Thus, “the FTC established its prima 
facie case that the proposed merger would violate section seven of the Clayton 
Act.”186   
The establishment of the FTC’s prima facie case creates a rebuttable presumption 
of illegality.187  The burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of a 
section seven Clayton Act violation.188  At this point, the court considers any 
evidence by the defendant of ease of entry into the market for new competitors.189  If 
the defendant successfully provides the necessary evidence to invalidate the 
presumption, then the burden of proof shifts back to the FTC.190   
                                                          
three most recent years and that the hospital is more than five years old.’”  Such a merger will 
be protected from antitrust claims by the government.  Id.   
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181Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. at 1285.  
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IV. CLEVELAND CLINIC HEALTH SYSTEM (CCHS) AND ITS SUBSIDIARIES 
The Cleveland Clinic Health System opened its doors in 1997.191  CCHS is a 
non-profit organization located in Cleveland, Ohio, with annual revenue in excess of 
$2.2 billion.192  CCHS owns and operates numerous hospitals in the greater 
Cleveland area, including Euclid Hospital, Fairview Hospital, Hillcrest Hospital, 
Huron Hospital, Lakewood Hospital, Lutheran Hospital, Marymount Hospital, South 
Pointe Hospital, Cleveland Clinic Children’s Hospital for Rehabilitation, and The 
Cleveland Clinic.193 
A.  CCHS Affiliates 
The Cleveland Clinic (The Clinic) is a 954 bed hospital, located on Euclid 
Avenue in Cleveland, Ohio.  Founded in 1921, the Clinic began as a private, 
nonprofit organization, which incorporates clinical and hospital care with education 
and research.194  Annually, the Cleveland Clinic has more than 1.2 million outpatient 
visits, and also has over 50,000 inpatient admissions from all over the United States 
and from more than eighty countries, generating over $2.3 billion in revenue from 
patient care alone.195  The Clinic has received a great deal of recognition from U.S. 
News & World Report and has been named one of the top six hospitals in the 
country for the past eleven years.196  The Clinic is also the only hospital in Ohio to be 
named one of the “Best Hospitals in America,” according to the magazine.197  In 
addition to the main hospital campus near downtown Cleveland, the Clinic has 
family health centers and surgery centers located throughout Cleveland’s 
surrounding suburbs.198   
The Clinic has a laundry list of specialty areas that it provides, including: cancer, 
cardiology, colorectal surgery, dentistry, dermatology, emergency medicine, 
endocrinology, gastroenterology, general surgery, gynecology and obstetrics, 
hematology and medical oncology, infectious disease, nephrology and hypertension, 
neurology and neurological surgery, ophthalmology, orthopaedic surgery, 
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otolaryngology, pediatrics and all pediatric sub-specialties, plastic and reconstructive 
surgery, pulmonology, radiation oncology, radiology, rehabilitation, rheumatic and 
immunologic disease, thoracic and cardiovascular surgery, transplantation, urology, 
vascular medicine and vascular surgery.199  Taking into account the number of 
staffed beds and the numerous specialty areas that the Clinic provides, the Clinic 
ranks as the largest hospital in Cleveland.200   
In 1998, the Cleveland Clinic Health System added the Cleveland Clinic 
Children’s Hospital for Rehabilitation, formally named Health Hill Hospital. In 
September of 1999, the hospital changed its name to its current designation.201  The 
Cleveland Clinic Children’s Hospital for Rehabilitation is a fifty-two bed, non-profit 
organization and “the region’s premier provider of comprehensive pediatric, medical 
and rehabilitative services for children with chronic illnesses and disabilities 
(including those caused by trauma; birth defects, brain and spinal cord injury; and 
respiratory, orthopaedic, neuromuscular and developmental disorders).”202  The 
Children’s Hospital is one of the few hospitals in the United States that provide 
accredited pediatric services.203 
Euclid Hospital, originally named Glenville Hospital, was established in 1907, 
and built at its current location in 1952.204 Now a member of CCHS, Euclid Hospital 
houses 371 licensed beds.205 This hospital offers a number of medical services 
including: emergency services, surgery, acute-care, sub-acute-care, rehabilitation, 
and outpatient care.206  
Fairview Hospital, an acute-care hospital located in Westlake, Ohio contains 469 
licensed beds.  Significantly, Fairview has been a part of the Cleveland community 
for over 100 years.207  Only recently did Fairview become part of CCHS.208  
Fairview Hospital includes an Emergency department that also provides a Level II 
trauma center and a FastER Care program. The FastER program provides services to 
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patients with less severe injuries and ailments.209  Fairview Hospital also maintains a 
hospital-based surgery center, and a top-of-the-line outpatient surgery center.210  
Every year this hospital provides inpatient, outpatient, and emergency care to well 
over 300,000 patients.211   
Hillcrest Hospital began in 1968 as a nonprofit organization in Mayfield Heights, 
Ohio.  Hillcrest maintains 347 full-service staffed beds.212 Hillcrest offers a great 
deal of health care services, which include: “laser and outpatient surgery, a maternity 
center, a Neonatal Intensive Care [unit], a pediatrics unit, an invitro fertilization 
program, a Women’s Resource Center, and digestive health centers, state-of-the-art 
radiology services, a Level II trauma center, comprehensive cardiovascular services 
(open heart surgery, intensive care and coronary care units), and a cancer center.”213   
According to a survey done by HCIA, a leading company in providing information 
on the health care industry, during the last four out of five years, Hillcrest was named 
one the country’s top 100 hospitals.214 
Huron Hospital, established in 1874 and located on the former Rockefeller estate, 
is an acute-care teaching hospital with 211 licensed beds.215  Huron Hospital 
practices in a number of specialty areas including: “Behavioral Health Services, 
including inpatient and outpatient mental health, chemical dependency and 
detoxification services, and Diabetes Education and Management,” which provide 
expert health care services to the community.216  Huron bears the distinction of being 
the only eastside hospital that provides hospital-based 9-1-1 emergency services.217  
It also has a well-trained Emergency Medical Service (EMS) crew that responds to 
the emergency calls of East Cleveland and Bratenahl, transporting those patients to 
the hospital’s Level II Trauma Center.218  As a Level II Trauma Center, Huron 
hospital may treat the most severe life and limb-threatening injuries.219 
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Lakewood Hospital, a 400-bed acute-care hospital, was founded in 1907.220  
Located on the Westside of Cleveland, Lakewood practices in a number of specialty 
areas, including: “Behavioral medicine, accredited diabetes education and 
management, emergency services, Level II trauma center, geriatric medicine, home 
care, maternal and child health, orthopedics, rehabilitation services, skilled nursing 
facility, surgical specialties.”221  As a member of CCHS, Lakewood prides itself on 
being a community-based hospital providing the highest quality of care to the 
Westside of Cleveland.222 
Lutheran Hospital was established in 1896 and serves downtown Cleveland, Ohio 
City, and Cleveland’s Westside.223  Lutheran is a 219-bed, acute-care hospital 
providing a large array of primary health care, including; “Adult and geriatric 
behavioral health, primary care services, emergency medicine, orthopedic and spine 
care, pain management, physical and occupational therapy, rehabilitation services, 
sports medicine, urology.”224  Lutheran has just recently become a member of 
CCHS.225   
Founded in 1949 by the Sisters of Saint Joseph, TOSF, Marymount Hospital is a 
nonprofit Catholic hospital, providing acute-care services to Southern and 
Southeastern Cuyahoga County and the adjacent neighborhoods.226  Through the 
years, Marymount continued to grow and expand, allowing it to become a member of 
CCHS.227  Marymount currently offers “ambulatory and minimally invasive surgery, 
behavioral and occupational health, women’s services including mammography, 
obstetrics and gynecology, diagnostic cardiac catheterization, CT and MRI Imaging 
including a Regional Radiology Center, sports medicine and rehab, [and] 
endoscopy,” along with numerous other programs to provide top-of-the-line health 
care in the Southern Cuyahoga County area.228 
South Pointe Hospital, created in 1994 with the merger of Brentwood and 
Meridia Suburban hospitals, is a teaching hospital, affiliated with Ohio University 
College of Osteopathic Medicine.  South Pointe contains 223 licensed beds.229  This 
hospital provides a wide range of medical and surgical services to the area including: 
“cancer care, cardiac care, coronary/intensive care, emergency medicine, 
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rehabilitation and surgery.”230  South Pointe is currently expanding its facilities, with 
a projected completion date of 2003.231  The construction project is estimated to cost 
$30 million.232 
B.  Major Competitors 
CCHS competes with two major health systems in northeast Ohio.  The first 
competitor is University Hospitals Health System (UHHS).  Located in northeast 
Ohio, UHHS facilitates eleven hospitals: University Hospitals of Cleveland, which 
also consists of the Alfred and Norma Lerner Tower, Lakeside Hospital, Samuel 
Mather Pavilion, MacDonald Women’s Hospital, Rainbow Babies & Children’s 
Hospital, Ireland Cancer Center, Psychiatric Center at Hanna Pavilion; UHHS 
Bedford Medical Center, UHHS Brown Memorial Hospital, UHHS Geauga Regional 
Hospital, UHHS Memorial Hospital of Geneva, UHHS Laurelwood Hospital, 
Southwest General Health Center, Mercy Medical Center, St. John West Shore 
Hospital, St. Vincent Charity Hospital, Saint Luke's Emergency Center, are also 
affiliated with UHHS.233  Similar to CCHS, UHHS provides a wide range of health 
care services to the community through the partnering of local area hospitals.234 
The second major CCHS competitor is Metro Health System (MHS).  MHS 
opened in 1837 as City Hospital.235  MHS is also one of the leading health care 
providers in northeast Ohio.236  MHS consists of: MetroHealth Medical Center, 
MetroHealth West Park Medical, Building, MetroHealth Asia Plaza Health, Care 
Clinic, MetroHealth Southwest Medical Group, and MetroHealth Brooklyn Medical 
Group.237  Similar to its two competitors, MHS provides an extensive array of health 
care services to the community, but differs from the other two in that one of its listed 
goals is to control the cost of health care.238  These three major health care providers 
in northeast Ohio compete for control over the product market discussed herein. 
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C.  Recent Developments 
Some of the most recent activity by CCHS occurred in May 2000, when 
Bankruptcy Judge Mary F. Walrath approved CCHS’ bid of $52.65 million to 
purchase the Integrated Medical Campus in Beachwood, Ohio, which was formerly 
part of, now bankrupt, Primary Health Systems (PHS).239  Prior to this order by the 
court, CCHS attempted to purchase the Integrated Medical Campus in Beachwood, 
St. Michael Hospital in Slavic Village, and Mt. Sinai Medical Center East in 
Richmond Heights for $62 million.240  Although providing no evidence of bad-faith 
on the part of CCHS, the Bankruptcy court supplied numerous instances where PHS 
was less than honest.241  PHS was given a thirty-day timeframe during which it could 
seek bids for the three entities (St. Michaels Hospital located in Slavic Village; Mt. 
Sinai Medical Center East situated in Richmond Heights; and the Integrated Medical 
Campus in Beachwood).242  Despite the fact that the end result here appeared to 
benefit all involved, including the community, the negotiations between CCHS and 
PHS had a high potential to end with an anticompetitive outcome. 
V.  ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION OF CURRENT LAW TO A POTENTIAL ACQUISITION BY 
CCHS OF ANOTHER LOCAL AREA HOSPITAL 
This analysis assumes that the FTC has jurisdiction over a nonprofit organization. 
This assumption is based on the relevant case law, and language set forth in Section 
eleven of the Clayton Act.  If the FTC sought a preliminary injunction against an 
acquisition proposed by CCHS to acquire another acute-care facility, the court would 
have to determine the likelihood of the FTC’s ultimate success on the merits.  
Specifically, the FTC would be required to demonstrate that the proposed merger 
would result in the substantial lessening of competition in the relevant market in the 
future.243  Initially, the burden of proof rests on the FTC.244  The FTC must prove 
that following the merger, CCHS would control an undue share of the Cleveland 
area’s relative market, including both the product and geographic markets.   
The background information previously discussed on the hospitals owned by 
CCHS, would permit the FTC to define two relative product markets.  The first 
product market would be the market for “general acute-care inpatient hospital 
services.”  The FTC defines this market as a general accumulation of diverse 
services and qualifications that are essential to provide the necessary medical and 
surgical needs, as well as other services required by inpatients, e.g., anesthesia, 
intensive care capabilities, lodging, operating rooms, pharmaceuticals, and 24-hour 
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nursing care.245  With the application of the cluster test, these services and 
capabilities must be viewed as a group which the consumer would not be able to find 
a reasonable substitute for outside of a general acute-care hospital.246 
The second market that the FTC would recognize is “primary-care inpatient 
hospital services.”247  The FTC defines primary-care services to consist of basic or 
standard inpatient hospital services offered at a majority of general acute-care 
hospitals, for example, normal childbirth, general medicine and general surgery.248  
Because courts have recognized these markets in the past as suitable product markets 
for mergers within the health care industry, this aspect of the relative market will not 
be that difficult for the FTC to prove.249   
The geographic market, on the other hand, requires a much more complex 
analysis in order to determine how far such a market reaches.  The FTC, through 
expert testimony, would want to define the geographic market as narrowly as 
possible, giving CCHS control over a larger market share.  On the contrary, CCHS 
would want to define the geographic market as broadly as possible.250   Even though 
the Elzinga-Hogarty test is the primary test used to determine the area defined as the 
geographic market, plaintiff’s expert and the defendant’s expert, as well the court, all 
may interpret the information differently.251  If the court accepts CCHS’ expert 
testimony broadly defining the geographic market, this will not preclude the FTC 
from ultimately succeeding on the merits, but will result in an increased burden on 
the FTC to prove undue market control by the defendant.  If the court is willing to 
accept the FTC’s expert testimony however, which narrowly defines the relevant 
geographic market, this eases the burden on the FTC to prove control over a 
disproportionate market share.  The acceptance of either testimony results in the 
completion of the definition of the relevant market.   
After adequately defining the relevant market, the FTC would then need to prove 
that the proposed acquisition would result in an increase in the concentration of 
power in the above-defined markets, giving CCHS excessive control over the 
market.252  Next, an analysis of the relevant market concentration will be necessary.  
If for example, there are four competitors in the geographic market as defined above, 
each having an equal market share, this would translate into twenty-five percent for 
CCHS, twenty-five percent for University Hospital Health System (UHHS, twenty-
five percent for Metro Health System (MHS), and twenty-five percent for the 
                                                                
245Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. at 1290. 
246Id. 
247Id. 
248Id. at 1288. 
249Id. at 1289(citing Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d at 268; University Health, 938 F.2d at 1211; 
Mercy Health Services, 902 F. Supp. at 976). 
250See generally Alexander, supra note 2, at 104. 
251Id. at 105. 
252See generally Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. at 1294 (citing Univ. Health, 938 
F.2d at 1218). 
166 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 17:137 
potential unnamed fourth.  Applying the HHI, the resulting number is 2500.253  This 
result constitutes a concentrated market; any merger or acquisition within this market 
with an increase in the HHI by more than 100 points would raise a red flag for 
potential anticompetitive activities.  Further, assuming that CCHS acquires one of 
the competitors, resulting in control of fifty percent of the relative product market, 
the resulting HHI would be 3,750, an increase of 1,250 points, which is a substantial 
increase in market power.  This result would suffice to show excessive 
concentration.   
Although the numbers set forth are strictly hypothetical, a March 2000 article 
established that prior to the purchase of Integrated Medical Campus in Beachwood, 
CCHS controlled sixty-two percent of the market share for hospital beds in the 
Cleveland area.254  Assuming that the percentage of CCHS market control has not 
changed as of today, this would leave thirty-eight percent to be divided among 
competitors in the geographic market.  CCHS’ two biggest competitors in the 
geographic market are UHHS and MHS.  Based on the amount of the market that 
CCHS controls, this allows for the assumption that these two health systems together 
control a substantial amount of the remaining thirty-eight percent.255  Therefore, even 
if CCHS were to acquire another one percent of the market it would result in an 
increase of the HHI of over 100 points.  The courts would view any such acquisition 
by CCHS as “likely to create or enhance market power or facilitate its exercise.”256  
Based on this HHI analysis, and assuming that the relevant market is proven, a court 
would likely conclude that the FTC satisfied its prima facie case.  Again, once the 
FTC establishes its prima facie case, it creates a rebuttable presumption of 
illegality.257  The burden then shifts to the defendant to provide evidence that 
undercuts the extrapolative worth of the FTC’s facts.258  If the defendant succeeds in 
providing the necessary evidence to invalidate the presumption, then the burden of 
proof shifts back to the FTC.259 
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A.  Defenses 
CCHS may raise two potential defenses to shield it merger actions.  The first 
defense, termed the “failing company doctrine” states that the acquisition of stock of 
another company in failing conditions will be permissible if the defendant can prove 
the following: that recovery is improbable, that the acquisition is not detrimental to 
community, and that the acquisition does not significantly diminish competition or 
restrain commerce within objectives of section seven of the Clayton Act.260  The 
failing firm defense may be invoked if the defendant can prove that a corporation's 
capital and assets are so exhausted and the possibility of revitalization is so bleak 
that the company faces “grave probability of business failure.”261   
To employ this defense, the defendant must also show that without the merger or 
acquisition there is potential harm to the stockholders of the “failing” company and 
the community, and that defendant, as a competitor, is the only potential buyer 
available.262  Also, the defendant must demonstrate that the purpose of the merger or 
acquisition is not to impair or lessen competition, but is consummated to assist the 
defendant’s accrued business and to prevent harm to the public with the loss of a 
resource, without lessening competition or restraining commerce.263  Based on the 
description set forth above, CCHS would have a great deal of difficulty proving that 
the acquisition of as little as one percent of the market is for any of the purposes set 
forth above. 
The second defense CCHS may utilize is the “efficiencies” defense.  Assuming 
the FTC proves it prima facie case, then CCHS’ acquisition of one percent of the 
market substantially lessens competition.  Therefore, CCHS must prove that the 
consequences of the proposed merger have considerable economic effects that help 
competition, and thus the consumer.264  Operating cost reductions and elimination of 
duplicative equipment and departments are examples of economic efficiencies that 
may lower costs to consumers.265  Extensive research however, indicates no 
documentation of any such activity by CCHS.  Therefore, unless CCHS were to 
show that the results of a proposed merger or acquisition were to enhance 
competition and help consumers, then the merger or acquisition should be 
permanently enjoined. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This article first describes the origin and scope of the Sherman Antitrust Act and 
the Clayton Antitrust Act.  Then it discusses the application of these Acts to different 
industries, most specifically the health care industry.  Following that, this article 
establishes the FTC’s jurisdiction over mergers of nonprofit companies.  Finally, this 
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analysis is applied to a possible merger between CCHS and another competitor 
within the geographic market established above. 
Through this analysis, it appears that it would not be inordinately difficult for the 
FTC to establish a prima facie case against CCHS.  A genuine concern may arise 
with CCHS’ potential defenses.  If the Bankruptcy Court had allowed CCHS to 
acquire all of PHS’ assets, such an acquisition would certainly have given rise to 
numerous antitrust issues.  The real FTC problem in this instance would not have 
been establishing proof of CCHS’ undue control over the market, but rather rebutting 
CCHS’ defense that PHS was a failing firm.  By raising a “failing firm” defense, 
CCHS could be deemed to be helping to maintain, as opposed to hindering, a 
competitive market.   
Another possible CCHS defense is a cost-efficiency defense, whereby CCHS 
could claim, and would ultimately have to prove, that the acquisition eliminated 
duplications in service, and thus reduced the costs to consumers.  Although the 
burden of persuasion ultimately rest on the FTC, it will still be the responsibility of 
CCHS to prove that its actions where not anticompetitive in nature.  In closing, it 
would behoove the FTC to keep a close watch on future CCHS activities. 
MATTHEW T. POLITO 
 
